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 I
In 1967 Zofia and Oskar Hansen presented in Warsaw
the principles of the Linear Continuous System (LCS),
concerning a gigantic structure of urban and architec-
tural development, which was to run in wide stripes
from the North to the South of Poland, with the popula-
tion of more than a dozen million people. The main as-
sumption was to abandon the concentric structure of
cities and towns, or any settlements in general, be-
cause of their growing inefficiency and failure to satisfy
the needs of their residents both in functional terms,
such as health care, and in psychological and ideolo-
gical ones. The Hansens advised the zone-linear
mode of planning as a solution to a number of contra-
dictions troubling the historical and modern urban
units, such as the shortage of space, high prices,
scarcity of greenery and fresh air, and transportation
problems caused by the wrong distribution of work-
places, supplies, and centers of culture and education.
A modular zone system located along the main thor-
oughfare offered a chance to create an egalitarian
space that guaranteed easy and common access to all
its elements. On the one hand, functional accommoda-
tion units were situated near workplaces, educational
institutions, services, and entertainment facilities, and
on the other, they were isolated from the negative con-
sequences of that proximity (i.e. living in the densely-
populated city centre), so characteristic of the concent-
rically developed townships. In addition, the rational
distribution of the zone-linear system allowed to im-
pose on the chaos of everyday life a network of regu-
lating principles concerning, for instance, the amount
of healthy physical effort (measured by the length of
pedestrian routes) and the types of human relations
(by programming  the ratio of privacy and collective-
ness), as well as revealed the basic principle of com-
munity (i.e. cooperation) by combining the zones of
the served and the service personnel. Economy was
rationalized, too, since the designers assumed full em-
ployment, possible thanks to the preplanned functional
and economic relations among particular zones. The
number of residents had to be adjusted to that of
stores, schools, hospitals, restaurants, libraries, etc.
The rational and functional order of the LCS, to-
gether with its aesthetics, makes it one of the major
examples of modernism in the history of Polish art,
contrasted with the town of Nowa Huta, developed
near Cracow around huge steelworks, and considered
to be a model of the socialist realism. The LCS is
the other extreme of what is bright and modern, but
also rejected, misunderstood, and, unfortunately, ne-
ver implemented. Nowa Huta is what we must really
cope with, since it exists, though contrary to our inten-
tions and without acceptance. It is a symbol of coerci-
on, restrained will, and disregard for reason, nature,
and history.
Mislead by this contrast, Polish art historians tend
to forget that Oskar Hansen motivated his idea of
a new arrangement of space by the necessity to reject
the degenerated capitalist forms of urban planning,
which he described as “unhealthy human swarms,”
calling for their “draining and reclaiming.” Moreover, he
believed that such a fundamental spatial and social re-
construction was possible only with no private proper-
ty, by central decision-making and centralized funding.
He argued that the LCS was beneficial in its ideologi-
cal aspects as well due to its enforced egalitarianism
and military value determined by its modular and linear
form. He praised it as a powerful instrument of “our”
propaganda and as an advantage factor in the future
war with the West.1
It is, however, more important that the Hansens pla-
ced his linear city within a life project that was favored
by the twentieth-century avant-garde of urban planning
and architecture, particularly radicalized by the ideas
of the Soviet designers of the 1920s and 1930s. Their
new anthropology was rooted in the postulates of Marx
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and Engels as well as many high-ranking Soviet ideo-
logues who easily combined the Darwinian aspect of
Marxism with eugenics or even sexology. In brief, that
anthropology assumed a blurring of the difference bet-
ween the town and the countryside (Marx, Lenin) and
the reorganization of social life by planned destruction
of historically relative family models (Engels) in favor
of the collectivization of almost all walks of life, inclu-
ding raising children. The frame and instrument of that
project was new functional urban planning, which allo-
wed for the uniform distribution of the work force, and
for accommodating people in apartments consisting of
bedrooms occupied by single individuals or loosely re-
lated couples. The end to those social experiments in
which the individual was reduced to an element of no-
madic settlement structures moved according to the
needs of economy (buildings were to be constructed
from perishable materials) was put an end to after
1930 by Stalin who introduced a new family law, ban-
ned abortion, and abandoned the costly financing of
new settlements with the system of collective catering,
hygiene, and entertainment by the state.
II
The advocates of the Polish post-socialist-realist
modernity, quite often former socialist-realists themsel-
ves, turned the Polish tradition of the constructivist
avant-garde into a strongly negative point of reference.
In their view, the avant-garde compromised itself by its
naïve utopianism and equally naïve cult of the intellect,
both undermined by the atrocities of war. The critics
believed that the later Polish modernity opposed to
that tradition direct life experience. Tadeusz Kantor
reinterpreted in rationalist terms the gesture abstract
painting of the West as an effect of inventing an im-
mediate and music-like visual idiom which, in Kantor’s
view, not only liberated the emotional energy from the
painterly form, but also, by the apotheosis of the mat-
ter, reached to its secret nature discovered in the labo-
ratories of the physicists researching its atomic struc-
ture. Abstraction was thus interpreted as a visualizati-
on of the present knowledge of the microsm and ma-
crocosm and as an analogue of the modern scientific
imagination. Thus, the socialist-realist rule of connecti-
on between painting and reality was maintained in
a specific manner.
Later essays of Tadeusz Kantor and Mieczysław
Porębski (a leading critic of the time) brought still ano-
ther reading of that relationship: both of them empha-
sized the role of the painterly matter and stressed   the
importance of chance as a starting point in the strug-
gle with matter. Kantor wrote: 
“Only the interference of chance in painting tur-
ned out decisive. Chance in painting occurs
whenever the painterly matter of any kind defi-
nes itself and forms itself independently, while
the human factor is reduced to the inspiring sti-
mulus, the first gesture and primary motion...
Only the control over chance creates a new rea-
lity... It is the moment when human action oppo-
ses the activity of the matter.”2 
Consequently, the presented theories maintained
the connection of painting and reality not by imagery,
symbolism or the emotional atmosphere fostered by
the control over the universe of the painterly form, but
by the struggle with the element of the matter or, more
precisely, by comparing that struggle with real life, and
by the historically and subjectively specific “kind of be-
havior” in it. Such an idea of art, with no direct refe-
rences to existentialism but very close to Rosenberg’s
action painting, made Kantor write: “Here there is no
longer any imitation of the imagined reality. A painting
becomes creation itself and a manifestation of life – its
continuation.”3
As we can see, on the one hand, the modern, unre-
stricted abstraction echoed the avant-garde dream of
the universal idiom, in that case exemplified by
the control over the matter approached as the vehicle
of meaning, while on the other, this abstraction makes
a positive connection of art and life. The struggle with
the matter thus became a basic value, as well as
the analogy of artistic intention and scientific thought.
In general, all that placed modern art within the socia-
list-realist system of values. In the quasi-ideological
language, the artist’s struggle with the painterly matter
became close to the daily toil of the worker, which was
supposed to make that new abstraction significantly
and favorably different from the intellectual, theoreti-
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cal, and autonomous geometrical abstraction of the
pre-war avant-garde with its purely visual aesthetics.
The truth conveyed by the work of art acquired an
emotional value, while the form became emotive so
that only approaching it through feeling might lead to
truth. In the process of response, that feeling was
translated into a series of associations articulated in
quite a literary manner. Critics wrote about the green
surfaces of fear, lines vibrating with nervous tension or
a premonition of the catastrophe triggered by abstract
forms. On the one hand, it was a continuation of the
avant-garde ideas of the artistic language proposed by
Kandinsky, on the other, an attempt to renew the so-
cialist realism by the idiom of condensation and meta-
phor, able to convey the worldview developed by the
communist ideologues.
III
One of the most spectacular scenes in Andrzej
Wajda’s film called Lotna (1959) shows a charge of
Polish cavalry against German tanks in September
1939, right after the outbreak of World War II. The
most expressive moment of that scene comes when
a Polish cavalryman helplessly – and actually mind-
lessly – hits the barrel of a German tank with his sab-
re. The film presents the Polish military, particularly the
officers in command, as completely inept – indifferent
to the loss of life by rank and file soldiers. The point is,
however, that in September 1939 such charges never
took place since indeed they would not have made
sense and, on top of that, would have denied the main
idea of using cavalry for moving masses of soldiers
along the frontline so that they could then fight as in-
fantry. In fact, horses were used in World War II by dif-
ferent armies. No one remembers an attack of the Itali-
an cavalry on the Don in the fall of 1942, the Soviet
cavalry fighting in the battle of Moscow and surroun-
ding the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, or the Ger-
man cavalry crossing the Seine. Still, the scene from
Wajda’s film has its historical antecedent – in the first
decade of September, in the area of Bory Tucholskie
in the western part of Poland, two squadrons of Polish
cavalry attempting to surround the enemy troops were
massacred by their armored vehicles. The evidence
was discovered on the next day by Italian war corre-
spondents, informed by German soldiers that the Po-
les attacked tanks on horseback. The Nazi propagan-
da used that event to create the myth of the “foolish
Polish cavalry,” believed both in Germany and, after
the war, in Poland. The Nazi propaganda films showed
even the allegedly authentic charges of Polish horse-
men against tanks to discredit the Polish military in ge-
neral.
The charge scene is not exceptional in Lotna. The-
re are many others like that, more effectively using
modern filming techniques, in particular Eisenstein’s
mode of montage, allowing to achieve the intensity of
meaning thanks to juxtaposed frames. What matters,
then, is not the mimetic aspect of the moving picture
but, on the contrary, the symbolic intensity of a cine-
matic image – for example: of a lonely Polish officer ri-
ding a white horse in a landscape with windmills,
a dead commander and a butcher who is cutting
a beef carcass with his blood-covered hands, or the
shadows of soldiers combined with fish dying on a kit-
chen table, devoured alive by a village cat.
Many scenes of that kind can be found in other
films by Wajda from the same period, including his
most famous Ashes and Diamonds, where the mem-
bers of the underground Home Army, in real history ar-
rested, detained, and murdered by the Red Army by
tens of thousands, in the film space walk out of shade
to be shown against the para-Nazi, heroic, painted
landscapes or, like the main protagonist, die on a heap
of rubbish. In this case, the paradox is that on the one
hand, Wajda’s films, and in general the so-called
Polish Film School of 1954-1965, have been interpre-
ted by historians as examples of resistance against
the socialist realism in cinema, while on the other, the
same directors made a number of very persuasive and
modern films whose symbolic meaning remained in
ideological agreement with the propaganda of the re-
gime installed in Poland by the Soviets.4
IV
In her book, Eyes on Russia, the American reporter
and photographer Margaret Bourke-White illustrated
her reportage from the Soviet countryside by a photo
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resembling the semi-abstract photos by Rodchenko,
packed with the images of rhythmically arranged parts
of machinery. The point is, though, writes Susan Buck-
Morss, that Bourke-White’s photo is subtitled An Ame-
rican Disc-Harrow. What does this American piece of
machinery do, asks Buck-Morss, as the centrepiece of
the documentation of a visit in the second largest state
farm in the USSR?5 An answer to this question that ap-
pears in the historical commentary of the author is
connected in the first place with the economic coope-
ration of the Soviet Russia with the West, particularly
the USA, continued in spite of the officially declared
ideological conflict. On the one hand, Western Europe
and the USA became for the USSR the model of inten-
sive industrialization, on the other, the West supplied
experts, designers, engineers, modern know-how, ma-
chines and technologies necessary for the building of
the Soviet industrial centres. In other words, the rapid
Soviet industrialization, with such examples as the
tractor plant in Chelyabinsk and the whole industrial
complex of Magnitogorsk would have never succee-
ded without the communists’ cooperation with the lea-
ders of modern industry from the western countries.
Notably, one of the sources of financing industriali-
zation was selling works of art from the Hermitage col-
lection. In 1930-1931 only Andrew Mellon spent in
a most discreet manner seven million dollars on the
paintings of the great masters, paying, for instance 1.7
million for Madonna Alba by Raphael, which was
enough to cover half of the cost of the general design
of Magnitogorsk.
Another paradox, writes Susan Buck-Morss, was
that: 
“[…] the profits of capitalism (surplus value with-
held from the wages of American workers) mo-
ved (via the Mellon family fortune) to finance (via
the capitalist firm of McKee Construction Com-
pany) the building of technologically advanced
socialist factories, an increase in what Marx cal-
led “constant capital” that in turn increased    the
value of Soviet labour. Meanwhile, in the coun-
terdirection, cultural “treasures” that had been
owned by the Russian aristocracy and nationali-
zed by the Bolsheviks became (via Mellon’s
“philanthropic” cover-up of tax evasion) the pro-
perty of the United States government – and the
American public received socialized culture in
the form of a national museum.”6
For us now, however, it is not only important that the
communist industry was built for the bourgeois money
or that the tanks and cannons which it produced were
used in alliance with Hitler against the West in the first
phase of World War II, but also that communism, inclu-
ding its Stalinist stage, was in fact a project of moder-
nization and that its close ties with modern technology,
architecture, and art, both on the ideological and prag-
matic level, have been duly forgotten by contemporary
historians.
 V
There are many similar paradoxes, but it is essenti-
al that they undermine the title myth of modernism that
is well known to every student of art in East-Central
Europe. One of the most important features of this
myth is schematizing historical reality by means of bi-
nary oppositions whose elements are coherent and
uniform. Consequently, on the one hand, we have
the regimes installed by Moscow, and on the other;
hosts of artists who favoured the culture of Western
Europe and opposed the ideology and policies of the
communist parties favouring, for ideological reasons,
the socialist realism – the only officially acceptable for-
mula of art concordant with the ideology underlying the
institutional and political system of power.
Second, this myth includes a belief that eventually
the binary conflict forced the regime to allow for some
freedom of artistic expression and accept the pre-
sence of modernism in the visual sphere. According to
Jindřich Chalupecký or Piotr Piotrowski, modernism,
particularly in the period of the 'Thaw', was in fact the
art of resistance against the communist power, with
the issue of the autonomous values of art used as a
weapon against its programmatic use for explicitly
political purposes.7 Notably, Piotrowski claims that the
belief in the political relevance of the modernist faith in
the autonomous value of art stemmed from the naiveté
of the East Central European artists, paving the way
for the communists to practice political manipulation in
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the form of apparent ideological openness demonstra-
ted in international relations. Piotrowski considers the
mythologization of the political significance of the auto-
nomy of art a crucial element of the specific cultural
identity of that region investigated by many scholars.
Ultimately, however, in his opinion, the belief in the
moral and, by the same token, political power of the
informel or geometrical abstraction played a negative
role, transforming modernism in a conservative traditi-
on which actually supported the communist regimes
through the institutional and conceptual elimination of
the really political art, identified by Piotrowski with the
neo-avant-garde of the 1960s and 1970s.8
In another text, Piotrowski stresses in the context of
the Central and Eastern European modernism not the
problem of the autonomy of art, but the utopian aspect
of the artistic projects from the 1920s and 1930s.
He interprets the utopias of the rational reorganization
of society as expressions of the resistance of artists on
the left against the contemporary social and political
demons, that is, fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism.
In other words, the projects of social harmony desi-
gned to foster human development were to them the
only imaginable alternative to totalitarian ideologies.9
It seems that the gist of the myth of modernism is
the belief in a fundamental difference between moder-
nism as an artistic outcome of the rational tradition of
the Enlightenment and its opposites – the totalitarian
regimes of the twentieth-century Europe. Whenever
someone lists quite numerous examples of modernist
artists cooperating with the fascists, the Nazis or the
Stalinist regime, as usual the following counter-argu-
ments appear: 1. There is no doubt that the moder-
nists were in different ways harassed by all those regi-
mes (true, but not all of them and not always – some
were admired and many cooperated for a long time);
2. Cooperation resulted from ideological seduction, yet
in the long run the artists were always betrayed by the
regime (but Rodchenko praised the educational role of
slave labour not only in 1930, when the Belomor Canal
was under construction, but also in 1936 and 1937 in
reference to the Dmitlager concentration camp near
Moscow); and 3. The modernists did not really coope-
rate with the totalitarian regimes, but played with them
a kind of a game, trying to save good art (yes, but Ter-
ragni or Michelucci were committed fascists and their
modernist buildings were supposed to express the fas-
cist ideology).
The point, however, is not to exchange arguments
but to put forward a historically tenable thesis that  the
complex relations between modernism and totalitaria-
nism stem from the fact that the latter was not an alter-
native to the process of modernization of which mo-
dernism was an aspect, but its inherent element based
on the same historical premises. What disappears in
the bright light of the mythical contrast is the constituti-
on of modernity, if only we define it not just in stylistic
terms, but also in terms of an artistic aftermath of the
anthropological revolution connected with the “disen-
chantment” of the world (Hegel, Weber), and the domi-
nation of the Cartesian rationalism combined with the
Faustian loss of moral orientation replaced by the will
to power and supported by the belief that the old world
collapsed, requiring spiritual, moral, and physical rege-
neration. Roger Griffin demonstrates that Marxism, as
well as Nazism or fascism, were actually ideologies of
regeneration, which grew out of the claim that the
world was in dramatic decline.10
The nihilist impulse deprived reality of its meta-
physical meaning – its social construction collapsed as
a result of a radical transformation “of traditional insti-
tutions, social structures, and belief systems under the
impact of Western modernization.” A way out of the
state of anomie was to be found in temporalizing histo-
ry and “reimagining the future as a permanently ‘open’
site for the realization of Utopias within historical time.”
According to Griffin: 
“Between the 1860s and the end of the Second
World War, modernism acted as a diffuse cultural
force generated by the dialectics of chaos and
(new) order, despair and hope, decadence and
renewal, destruction and creation, manifesting
itself in countless idiosyncratic artistic visions of
how new representations of reality could act as
the vehicle to revitalize ignored or forgotten prin-
ciples of a redemptive vision of the world, and
even help it regenerate itself socially and moral-
ly. Beyond the sphere of aesthetics and ‘high’
culture, the palingenetic dynamics of modernism
have also shaped numerous personal projects
and collective movements to establish a heal-
Piotr Juszkiewicz Farewell to a Myth kunsttexte.de/ostblick            3/2014 - 6
thier social and ethical basis for society, or inau-
gurate an entirely new socio-political order. This
order is conceived as an alternative modernity
which holds out the prospect of putting an end to
political, cultural, moral, and/or physical dissoluti-
on, and sometimes looks forward to the emer-
gence of a new type of ‘man’.”11
Let us add to this that anomie and the fall of the so-
called “sacred canopy,” caused by desacralization and
the Cartesian rationalization of the world understood
as an explicable cause-and-effect mechanical system,
disrupted, together with nihilism, the ideas of subjecti-
vity, goodness, and moral norms which philosophers
tried to recreate on the basis of rational pragmatism in
a way that was very distant from what we nowadays
call human rights or democratic principles. No doubt,
the most striking example in this respect was euge-
nics, accepted in the early decades of the 20th century
by many scientists from all over the world not as an
ethically suspect practice of deciding about human life,
but as a fully legitimate, scientific, and rational method
of regenerating the humankind.
To conclude this part of my paper, I want to stress
that the prospective and regenerative way of thinking,
characteristic both of political ideologies and the prac-
tice of power, facilitated the cooperation of modern ar-
tists with totalitarian regimes. In such a perspective,
the relationship of the socialist realism and modernism
is not bipolar, since both of them belong to modernity,
while the problem of stylistic differences and institutio-
nal tensions was related to political pragmatics rather
than crucial doctrinal differences.
It seems that the mythical picture of modernism has
its specific author or, rather, origin. It is an effect of
identity building by those who chose more or less di-
rect cooperation or coexistence with communism, be-
lieving that art could make things happen in politics.
VI
In fact, however, such a belief is rather unwarranted
since the policy makers prefer actions that bring speci-
fic results. In other words, an alternative to  the myth is
a claim that the totalitarian regimes were interested
not so much in highbrow art, kept obviously under con-
trol, as in mass culture seen as a much more effective
instrument of power.
Describing the mass society as an object of mani-
pulation by the totalitarian power, Susan Buck-Morss
argues that its rise cannot be separated from the mo-
dern mass media. Books or periodicals are too slow to
organize the public opinion, and the disembodied word
gives the masses no opportunity for cathexes, which
require imagery.12 She writes that the cinema, with its
combination of technology and the need for a modern
infrastructural revolution (access to electricity), was
the key medium in the building of mass society. Still, if
technology “hold(s) a mirror to the masses, it can also
blind them, if their own image obscures the manipula-
ting power behind the scenes.”13 The power of the ci-
nematic image gives form to the seemingly remembe-
red pictures of reality. For instance, continues Buck-
Morss, “when later Soviet generations ‘remembered’
the October Revolution, it was Eisenstein’s images
they had in mind.”14
Even though the Soviet propagandists were aware
of the power of Eisenstein’s moving pictures, particu-
larly their specific montage bringing together apparent-
ly unrelated images to create conceptual clusters, they
knew that their most effective vehicle was not the
avant-garde film, but melodrama or comedy addres-
sed to the mass audience. By no accident, Boris Shu-
myatsky, before he perished in the purges of the
1930s, traveled to the United States to watch the devi-
ces used by American directors. He realized that the
Hollywood model was “far more relevant for socialist
realism than the experiments of the avant-garde, prai-
sing it for its desire to produce ‘joyful spectacles’ ac-
cessible to the masses and its realistic style of con-
ventional narrative, including the khepi end (happy en-
ding).”15 
Therefore, to sum up shortly, to give up the myth
means also to painfully abandon the heroic aspect of
the East Central European identity, which has long
served us as an analgesic for our mutilated ego.
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Summary
Regardless of changing historical situation in particular
countries of the Eastern bloc modernism is usually re-
ferred to as a distinct artistic choice implying moral
and political protest against totalitarian Stalinist power
in favor of the cultural and democratic values of the
West. Such a myth of modernism as a tool of resist-
ance has shaped the worldview and intellectual per-
spective of many artists, art historians and critics from
Central and Eastern Europe and can be found even in
those studies whose authors realize that in some East-
ern bloc countries modern art was officially tolerated
(in Poland for example) and manipulated by the re-
gime. This paper shows how a specific combination of
modernism and many aspects of communist ideology
(a kind of Socialist modernism) which impacted culture
of Central and Eastern Europe Countries after WW II,
confronts this mythical modernism with its own histor-
ical and ideological foundations and political history of
the region.
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